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Abstract 
In content distribution market, the content popularity and market coverage 
have significant impacts on a network content provider's revenue. One way 
for a network content provider to obtain popular content is to peer with other 
providers and share contents. But the providers need to bargain and reach a 
win-win peering strategy. Thus, the aim of the present study is to characterize 
the popularity as the content quality through the analysis of how providers' 
peering can affect content quality they offer and change their market coverage. 
• The findings identify the peering conditions and optimal peering strategies for 
sharing contents. 
Firstly, we consider a static baseline model, whereby network content providers 
have static content and do not peer. We derive the coverage of the providers 
based on the quality of the contents and user subscription fees. Then we con-
sider how peering and content sharing can help providers to improve their 
revenues. The key insight is that peering will be desirable when the providers' 
total revenue is increased and properly shared by inter-provider financial trans-
fers. In the case of linear advertisement functions, peering will take place when 
providers have different abilities in generating advertisement revenue and set 
subscription fees properly. 
Secondly, we consider the dynamic content model, whereby a provider can 
introduce some high quality special content for a short period of time in order 
to attract users. Two cases of the special content budget sources are discussed: 
additional investment and finite budget. The findings indicate that the budget 
i 
source, the special content timing, the switching cost, the valuation of content, 
and time discount factor all play important roles in deciding the benefit of 
special content. 
Finally, we consider the peering incentive in dynamic content model and 
compare the optimal peering strategy with the the one in static content case. 
Two peering agreements for additional investment case are first analyzed: Peer-
ing over T time slots and Peering over One time slot. We discuss different 
advertisement revenue functions and present providers' peering incentive. In 
the case of linear advertisement revenue function, the findings show that the 
difference between static model and the two peering cases in dynamic model 
is for the scenario that the special content right holder has a stronger ability 
in generating advertisement revenue. For peering over T time slots case, the 
peering condition is stricter if the special content quality increases. Then, we 
identify that the peering incentive in finite budget case is higher than in ad-
ditional case. While for peering over one time slot case, we show that when 
providers consider the future revenues more in both special content budget 
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1.1 Background for Network Content Providers' 
Peering 
The digital revolution has prompted the development of the content distri-
bution service. At present, users can access their chosen contents through a 
variety of advanced technological distribution methods, such as satellite TV, 
cellular network and internet, as well as through traditional methods, including 
radio，broadcasting television, cable system and so on. This growing variety 
of content distribution methods has resulted in increased number of network 
content providers, who endeavor to attract users from other providers. To do 
this, providers should produce or purchase popular contents continuously, so 
as to draw as many users as possible to subscribe to their network. Popu-
lar content, such as live sports and Hollywood Movies, has a significant value 
in helping the network content providers to build up a substantial subscriber 
base. These competitive and contemporary contents can attract great interest 
from users, and can significantly increase the market coverage of the network 
content providers. This, in turn, will increase the providers' advertisement • 
and subscription revenues. One way for a network content provider to obtain 
popular contents is to peer with other providers in order to share contents. 
1 
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However, peering agreements among the network content providers are not 
always easy to reach. For example, Google TV, a new Internet-connected 
television platform, aims at providing users with new experiences of enjoying 
both traditional TV and web contents [1]. But some content providers {e.g., 
NBC and ABS in the U.S.) choose to block Google TV from accessing their 
TV programs [2]. These content providers are afraid that this new technol-
ogy may influence advertisers' choice of advertising platforms {e.g., Google 
TV vs. NBC's website) and reduce their advertisement incomes. 'A proper fi-
nancial agreement between Google and the content providers may resolve this 
issue. Besides regular contents, there are some special contents {e.g., world cup 
programs) that can attract many users during a certain period of time. Such 
attractive contents can be used as a powerful tool for network content providers 
to 'gain additional market share. The 2010 world cup broadcasting right issue 
in Hong Kong showed how fiercely content providers bargain over the spe-
cial content delivering right [3]. The official broadcast right holder (iCable in 
Hong Kong) has limited subscribers and wanted the content to reach a bigger 
coverage together with its own advertisement, while other content providers 
{e.g., TVB and ATV in Hong Kong) had a large audience and wished to pur-
chase the broadcasting right without the advertisement from iCable. A final 
agreement was reached which led to a win-win situation of both sides. Oth-
erwise, users who have not subscribed to iCable can not access the contents 
and enjoy the amazing football matches. This is definitely not beneficial from 
the social welfare's point of view. In a third example, mobile TV has been 
developed for a long time and has gone into the daily life of people. Users can 
access the contents and television programs through handhold devices while 
traveling. The worldwide mobile TV market has been growing fast [4]. It is a 
potential huge market awaiting for the network content providers to explore. 
However, although providers want to reach the potential large audience, indoor 
users typically have difficulty in accessing the mobile TV programs with a high 
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qimlity due to poor cellular signal receptions. Owners of large office buildings 
and shopping malls may help to "amplify" the signals through special equip- ‘ 
ments, and receive payments from the mobile TV providers for providing the 
extra coverage. The two providers need to bargain and reach a proper agree-
ment. So both them can benefit from the development of new technology for 
distributing contents. . 
In this study, we are motivated by the above three examples and want to 
study the interactions among multiple network content providers over content, 
coverage, and the possible strategies of peering. The network architecture is 
illustrated in Fig 1.1. 
Advertisement ； 
revenue \ m j . • Service \ 
Advertisers ^ > Network , 〉 users 
卜 Advertising H T O V I d e r S 卜 subscription 
Fee 
Figure 1.1: Network architecture among advertisers, network content 
providers, and end users 
The network content providers work as intermediaries to offer a platform 
for advertisers to deliver their advertisement, as well as provide the end users 
• with contents and advertisement. In this study, content quality is seen as a syn-
onym for content popularity. We will assume that network content providers 
obtain revenue through two approaches: advertisement income based on the 
agreement with advertisers and the market coverage, and subscription income 
based on the content quality and the subscription fees. However, the network 
content providers often can typically only cover a portion of the total mar-
ket share. Thus, other than increasing the content quality and decreasing the 
subscription fee, peering with other providers will be a viable option for the 
providers to increase coverage and revenues. However, for this avenue to be 
fully exploited, peering agreements must be perceived as fair and beneficial by 
all providers to the agreement. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 4 
Therefore, the present study aims to investigate the peering strategy be-
tween the network content providers. The focus will be on the interactions 
of two network content providers in three cases. In the first baseline "static" 
case, both providers have fixed quality contents and subscription fees over time 
and they do not peer with each other. We will examine the users' subscription 
choices and the corresponding market share. Then we study how providers' 
peering can increase their revenues with static contents. In the second "dy-
namic" case, providers can change their contents quality by introducing special 
content with high quality. Two cases of the special content budget sources will 
be considered: additional investment and finite budget. We will discuss how 
the budget sources, the introduction of a special content and switching cost will 
impact the users' subscription choices and the providers' revenues. It is fur-
ther assumed that the switching cost will only be incurred if the users switch 
to other provider from the original subscribing provider and the contract is 
terminated early [13]. In the third case, both providers consider whether or 
not to peer in delivering the special content. Two peering agreements for ad-
ditional investment case are consider: peering over T time slots and peering 
over one time slot. We first show how the providers' peering agreements in 
the "dynamic" case and the advertisement revenue functions affect the peering 
incentive, and compare their strategies with the peering strategy in static case. 
Then, we discuss the peering incentive for finite budget case. 
Our main results and contributions of this study are as follows: 
• General Network Model: We present a model that captures the interac-
tions among advertisers, network content providers, and users, and ex-
plain how users choices influence the network content providers' content 
strategies, revenues and peering incentive in both static and dynamic 
content model. 
V 
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• Win-win Peering Agreement: We propose a Nash bargaining based peer-
ing framework between providers in both content models, by considering ‘ 
the changes of content, advertisement, and coverage within the peering. 
We characterize the necessary condition for cooperation to happen, and 
show that a provider's bargaining power depends on its capability of 
generating advertisement revenue. 
• Impact of Dynamic Content: One-time special content induces users to 
switch providers. We show how the budget source, the switching cost, 
content evaluation, and time discount factor together determine a user's 
subscription decision and the providers' revenues. We further show how 
the introduction of special content changes the peering strategy between 
the providers, and compare it with the optimal peering strategy in static 
content model. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the 
related work in the area of content distribution market. Chapter 2 presents 
the static baseline model and shows the peering strategy between providers 
• through bargaining. The impact of dynamic content without peering between 
providers is given in Chapter 3 and the peering incentive in dynamic content 
model is presented in Chapter 4. We conclude in Chapter 5 and summarize 
the future work directions. 
1.2 Literature Review 
The research in the field of the interaction among the network providers has 
been experienced a marked development. Studies on different aspects of the 
phenomenon, such as the pricing policies of the contents and cooperating or 
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multi-homing with other network content providers have dominated the re-
search effort. Three types of stakeholders are often found during the interac-
tion procedures among providers-Content Providers (CP) (sometimes referred 
to as Advertisers, as is the case in the present study), Network Providers (NP) 
and Users. Although the NP offers a platform for the interaction between 
users and CPs, they can still have diverse interests. From CPs' perspective, 
the goal is to produce the contents and allow them to reach as many users as 
possible, yielding higher revenues. In contrast, NPs provide the contents with 
the access channels to user and desire to acquire the contents exclusively. So 
they can obtain a competitive advantage in attracting users compared with 
other providers. Finally, the users are concerned primarily with being able 
to access the popular contents whilst paying a low subscription fee. These 
different concerns of the three kinds of stakeholders lead to different research 
directions, which, in turn, yield various results and implications. 
One research direction in this area is that the content distribution market 
is regarded and analyzed as a two-sided market. Reference [34] and [36] define 
a two-sided market as an environment whereby any change of the charge price 
by the NP will directly influence the other stakeholders (CP and Users) and 
the transactions between them. There are many examples of this kind of 
market, i.e., the credit card market, the newspaper, the television industry, 
search engines and internet service industry. References ([6], [33], [35],[10] and 
32]) have conducted an framework analysis for the pricing structure of NP. 
Their findings indicate that the intermediary is often inclined to charge less or 
subsidize one side of the stakholder (i.e., users) to attract users to subscribe . 
to the service, he view is that the cost of the subsidy will be covered by 
the increase in the charges for the other stakeholders. This pricing structure 
stems from the indirect network effect between the two sides. It is based on the 
assumption that if more users join in the platform NP, the CP will enjoy the 
increasing potential to sell their products, which will lead to CP paying a high 
•4 
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price to subscribe to the platform service. Hence, the platforms are willing to 
offer some benefits to attract users to join their services. In addition to the ‘ 
pricing structure, reference [17] studied the business model of CP, focusing on 
the optimal way for the CP to interact with the NP and users. The authors 
examined whether selling the products to the NP and charging a transaction fee 
(platform mode) or selling the products directly to users and paying a channel 
usage fee to the NP (merchant mode) would be preferred option. The findings 
suggest that the merchant mode is superior to platform mode if the platform 
aims solely to maximize profits. Moreover, under this scenario, the NP is 
not responsible for the content quality, making the strategy less risky. Our 
study can be viewed as one research work on this two-sided market area. But 
we will focus on the high-level problem (peering) with other network content 
providers) rather than investigating the optimal price structure of providers or 
figuring out the providers' business mode. 
Another research line is to investigate the content distribution strategy as 
an exclusivity problem. At present, content Providers can choose to multi-
home (non-exclusive contracts) or single-home (exclusive contracts) with the 
• network providers. In a traditional view, the network provider may attain a 
competitive advantage by entering into an exclusive arrangement with the cho-
sen Content Provider [21], as it can guarantee the return of the cost of acquiring 
the popular contents and increase the market entry level. Some works ([7] and 
20]) analyze the problem based on Hotelling model ([24]), assuming asym-
metries in contents quality and costs. Within their model, they analyze the 
effect of popular content and implicate that if the cost of the popular content is 
lump-sum based, exclusive contracts will be preferred. Otherwise, if the cost is 
based on pay-per-view, content providers prefer non-exclusive contracts. This 
reasoning can be explained from the perspective of CP, whereby, if it cannot 
estimate the actual number of users accessing the content, the lump-sum pay-
ment can decrease the risk of uncertainty and the exclusive contract is optimal. 
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Reference [39] concludes that exclusivity will induce providers to focus on price 
and content quality strategies. In return, this interaction between providers 
will ensure that all users can enjoy the increasing quality contents and lower 
subscription fees from this interaction between providers. However, as [7] and 
28] point out, the bidding wars for the popular content are pretty fierce. The 
cost is increasing exponentially. This is not beneficial from the view of NP. 
The development of new technology has greatly affected the media ecosystems 
14]. The transaction cost has been significantly reduced. Network providers 
tend to focus on service innovation rather than vertical integration with other 
providers. Moreover, reference [12] and [30] point out that exclusivity does not 
always prompt the network providers' business, rather it hinders the compe-
tition and innovation in both contents and associated technology. Reference 
8] and [18] argue that as more users will pay and access the popular contents, 
non-exclusivity can be profitable for popular contents providers. 
Although the exclusive contracts can increase the market entry levels, and 
cosequently hinders the competition between the providers, they may lead to 
a trend whereby there is no incentive for providers to focus on platform inno-
vation, which will yield restrictions in users' choice of the network providers. 
On one side, the exclusivity can achieve industry profits but at the expense 
of social welfare. On the other side, non-exclusivity can reach social welfare 
optimum whereby all users can access the popular contents, albeit leading to 
decreased industry profits. Thus, when designing policies, regulators should 
take these two sides into consideration and aim for optimal balance between 
social benefits and profits. Reference [22] suggests that if content is high p o p u - . 
larity, and network providers' market share difference is large, and the cost for 
delivering the content in two systems is low, the content producers can sign an 
exclusive contract. Otherwise, non-exclusive contract is more preferred. How-
ever, it is likely that the debate regarding the exclusivity issues will continue 
in the foreseeable future. The present study gives one direction for solving 
*« 
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the exclusivity problem, offering potential peering strategies to providers. The 
work presented in this thesis includes not only the transfer payment, but also ‘ 
considers the advertisement arrangement between the providers, which has not 
been investigated in the above studies. 
Furthermore, a number of extant studies discuss the interaction between 
the network providers, identifying two types of relationship: competitive and 
peering relationship. The former arises naturally when the providers require 
significant efforts to draw users to subscribe to their network. As their user 
coverage determines the subscription and advertisement revenue, they are mo-
tivated to become more competitive. In contrast, in the cooperative relation-
ship, the providers can increase their coverage with the help of other providers. 
Since there are multiple Network Providers that can deliver the CP's con-
tents to users, the market power of NP may be reduced. [19] shows that the 
social welfare and the content providers' benefit increase in competitive mar-
ket compared to the welfare in monopoly market. This view implies that the 
policy should encourage the competition in the market from a global view. 
However, from the perspective of NP, they need to consider their strategy that 
• would allow them to compete in such a market structure. Some studies ([16], 
15] and [5]) investigate how to choose contents and determine advertisement 
lengths to attract users. These works focus on the endogenous solutions to 
identify the optimal strategy for providers. They show that NPs will choose 
the optimal content types due to different settings [i.e., advertising rate, rev-
enue distribution between advertiser and platform). On the other hand, other 
authors investigate the business model of the network providers. Reference [31 
and [26] investigate how to increase revenue through either an advertisement-
sponsored only approach or a subscription- and- ad vert isement-sp onsor ed ap-
proach. Finally, the dynamics of competition has also been studied in the 
past. The findings indicate that, after the ex-post competition for attract-
ing users, when providers change their content quality or prices, some users 
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will switch the providers, but incurring the switching costs. Reference [13 
has provided a comprehensively survey of the effect of switching cost for the 
providers' competition. The results indicate that there is a lock-in effect for 
the switching cost. Since users need to pay after the first adoption, the early 
users' preference counts more than later adoptions. Hence, the competition 
for the future is less fierce and the entry of the market is not easy. However, 
none of the prior results have considered the peering among providers, which 
is the reason why the present study focused on this issue. 
Rather than competing with other providers, reference [38] studies the pos-
sibility of open access to other providers (i.e., internet service). The network 
providers can also collaborate with each other to deliver the contents. For ex-
ample, reference [29, 11] examined the incentive for ISPs to interconnect and 
develop Shapley value based revenue distribution mechanisms. Similarly, refer-
ence [23] studies the optimal pricing for CDN service and [19] studies the price 
and rate allocation of ISPs with content providers' participation. Reference 
•25] and [27] studied the revenue sharing mechanism between the CP and NP. 
These works consider the pricing strategies from the engineering perspective. 
However, most of them assume that each user has a fixed subscription to one 
provider and can not switch to different providers. 
In another study, reference [37] discusses the cooperation between Google 
and Yahoo, whereby the superior Google shares its search technique with its 
rival. If they choose to cooperate, the inferior search engine attains search 
technique and provides a higher quality service. Hence, it can provide bet-
ter result accuracy with the queries and consequently attract more users and 
increase the advertisement amount. In other words, the inferior side in the col-
laborative relationship can benefit from the peering. However, although the 
superior engine also benefits from increasing the price and the amount of ad-
vertisement, some users may switch to the inferior provider that will now offer 
competitive service, whereby the superior engine will lose some of its former 
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market share. Whether the superior enters the cooperation agreement depends 
on their assessment of the two effects. If the former effect outweighs the latter, ‘ 
it will cooperate. Otherwise, it will not share the technology. However, as 
there is no transfer payment between the two engines, the superior engine can-
not receive any benefit from the cooperator other than through increase in its 
own revenues. Reference [40] discusses about the cooperation between two Pay 
TV providers. The content holder will charge the cooperator a per-subscriber 
fee and a lump-sum payment. This makes sure that the content holders are 
always willing to cooperate with the rival. But this transfer is not fair for the 
cooperators. As the author proved, the per-subscriber fee can raise as high 
as possible. Hence, there is a possibility that the content holder extracts all 
the benefit from the cooperator and the cooperator get less or nothing. This 
is obviously riot fair for the cooperator. The cooperation strategy should be 
a win-in strategy so that both the participants have incentive to stick to the 
‘ peering. Also, there is no advertisement transfer as our work. In contrast, we 
consider the interactions of advertisers, network providers, and users. We de-
sign a fair revenue distribution mechanism for the providers, where users may 
switch between providers depending on the contents and subscription fees. 
/ 
Chapter 2 
A Static Baseline Model 
We consider a duopoly market of two network providers: A and B, Each 
provider has a dedicated advertiser, who pays the provider advertising fees 
based on the provider's coverage. A provider's coverage depends on the num-
ber of users subscribing to its service. A provider can attract subscribers by 
attractive contents or a low monthly subscription fee. 
2.1 Content Qualities and Subscribing Fees 
T 
We consider a period of T time slots, where each time slot has a unit length 
(e.g., representing one month of time). We characterize the contents' popular-
ity in time slot 亡 e {1，. •.，r} as content quality qi, where i G {A,B}. Higher 
value of Qi represents the contents are more attractive and popular to users. 
In this chapter's analysis, we assume that both providers have static contents, 
i.e., Qit = Qit' = qi for any t, t' G {1, • • •，T} and both i = A and i = B. Fig-
ure 2.1 illustrates one example of the static content quality for T time slots of 
the two providers. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that provider A has a more popular 
content, i.e., QA > QB- This may reflect the fact that provider A has a larger 
budget and can purchase/produce higher quality contents than provider B. 
We will come back to the budget issue in Chapter 3. 
12 
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Figure 2.1: Static content quality 
During each time slot, provider i e {A,B} charges each of its subscriber pi. 
As provider A has better contents for all T time slots, it can charge a higher 
subscribing fee, i.e., PA > PB- ^ We further assume that both PA and PB are 
fixed throughout this study. This allows us to focus our work on the impact of 
content choices and providers' peering incentive. 
2.2 Users' Utilities 
Users may achieve different satisfaction levels by consuming the same contents. 
We characterize a user with two parameters: 6 representing the user's valuation 
of the content quality, and 6 representing the user's time discount factor over 
future contents. A user's total utility of subscribing and consuming contents 
1 Assume this is not true and PA < PB- Then all users will choose provider A, who offers 
a better content with a lower fee. Provider B will have no subscribers and will be out of the 
market. This is apparently not an interesting case and will not be further discussed in this 
paper. -
•M 
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from provider i G {A, B} over T time slot is 
T 
u [ e , d � = e Y / - i q i t — PiT. (2.1) 
t=i 
Once the users choose their service providers, they need to sign an T time 
contract with their providers. For a user who is indifferent of choosing either 
provider, we have the following relationship between 9 and S: 
T T 
0 Y^ S'-'qAt-pAT = eJ2 — VBT. (2.2) 
i = l t=\ 
Based on (2.2)，we can compute the boundary evaluation 6*{d) as a function 
of which is 
• = T (似 1 丑)� • (2.3) 
Fig 2.2 illustrates one example of the boundary line of Users with 
parameters (0,6) below the boundary will choose to subscribe to provider B, 
while the users above the boundary will subscribe to provider A. We can see 
that is a decreasing function in terms of S. There are more users with 
small value of S choosing provider B, and more users with large value of 6 
choosing provider A instead of B. This is because for users with small value 6, 
they consider current content quality more than future one. Thus, they make 
their providers' choice mainly based on current content. While for users with 
large 5, they value the future content quality as current one. Thus, they make 
their decisions based on the total contract utility. These different preferences 
on future contents induce the different choice of providers among users. 
2.3 Providers' Coverages and Revenues 
For the rest of the analysis, we assume that both 0 and 5 are uniformly dis-
tributed in [0,1]. This assumption may not be always true for the real world. 
However, we argue that the different distribution of users only makes users' 
_ < « 
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Figure 2.2: Two providers' market shares 
choice of providers different. It will not change the analysis method and the 
result intuition. Without loss of generality, we normalize the total users popu-
‘ lation to be 1. Then the area under the boundary represents the market share 
of provider B (denoted as /?)，and the provider A has a market share of (1-/3). 
Since 0*(S) has been denoted as a function of S as in Equation (2.3)，the area 
• below the boundary line is an integration over S. Thus, the two providers' 
market shares are 
A，s coverage : 1 - / 3 = 1 - T ^ ^ ( f ^ ~ ” : ) � dS, (2.4) 
1 Jo E L 炉一 1 似t — E L 沪-1 卯, . 
5，s coverage .： ^ = f / ‘ (2.5) 
We assume that provider i e {A, B} has a advertisement revenue function 
M. ) per time slot. Here / � ( . ) i s an increasing function of its market share. If 
there are no users accessing the contents, no advertisers would like to pay for 
the advertisement. Thus /^(O) = 0. The two providers' revenues over T time 
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slots are 
tta 二 (2.6) 
7TB = (2.7) 
2.4 Content Procurement Strategies 
Each provider may change its revenue through contents procurement^ . We 
consider two possibilities in the next discussions: peering between providers to 
share contents and increase coverage (Section 2.5 and Chapter 4), and intro-
ducing special content to attract users to switch providers (Chapter 3). 
2.5 The Peering and Bargaining of Providers 
2.5.1 Peering Agreement 
When two providers peer with each other in this static content quality situ-
ation, we assume that one provider will purchase the whole content from the 
other provider. Since provider A has a better content {i.e., QA > QB as assumed 
in Section 2.1)，provider A will be the seller and provider B will be the buyer. 
However, these two providers have different concerns when peering. From 
A's point of view, it wishes to deliver both the content and its advertisement 
in B,s network, so as to increase the advertisement revenue from its dedicated 
advertiser. Provider A also wishes B to pay for the usage of the content. 
Prom B's point of view, it wishes to carry its own advertisement in order to 
I 
get payment from its own dedicated advertiser. Provider B also wishes A to 
pay for the additional coverage after peering with B. They need to bargain 
over and over and reach a win-win peering strategy. 
^Recall that we have assumed the subscribing fees pa and pn are fixed in this work. 
* 
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Next we describe a general peering agreement. When peering, provider A 
and B will deliver the same content (i.e., the original content of provider A). ‘ 
As for advertisement, provider A will deliver its own advertisement. Provider 
B delivers a portion of A's advertisement and (l-a) portion of its own adver-
tisement. Finally, B pays provider A a one-time payment c for peering over 
T time slots, where c can be either positive or negative. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 
illustrate the two providers' contents and advertisements with and without 
poeririg. 
A: , A's content,A's advertisement. 
B:丨 B's content, B's advertisement, 
Figure 2.3: Two providers' contents and advertisements without peering 
A: I A's content , A's advertisement, 
B: I A's content , a , 1-a , 
Figure 2.4: Two providers' contents and advertisements with peering 
The bargaining variables are the advertisement ratio a and payment c. 
. Figure 2.5 illustrates this bargaining process and the exchange of content and 
advertisement. 
Content & Advertisement a 、 
Provider A , / Provider B 
r payment (c) 
Figure 2.5: Bargaining model 
2.5.2 Change of Coverage 
Now let us consider how users change their subscriptions when providers peer. 
Horc wo assume that all users are freely to choose. This may not be the 
case where users already sign contracts with their providers. The additional 
switching cost because of this will be further discussed in Chapter 3. Since' 
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now, both providers have the same contents and provider B charges a lower 
price PB < PA, then all users will choose to subscribe to provider B. Provider 
A will get zero subscriber. However, notice that since a part of provider 
A's advertisement is delivered through B, then provider B's coverage also 
contributes to the advertisement revenue of A. 
2.5.3 Providers' Revenues 
Now let us compute the providers' revenues with peering. For provider A, its 
advertisement can reach all users with a fraction of the time. But it will receive 
no subscription revenue due to the loss of all subscribers. Hence, provider A's 
revenue with peering is 
‘ 7T%{a,c) = a fA{ l )T + c. (2.8) 
For provider B, it receives all users subscription fees and delivers its own 
advertisement to all users with (1 - a) fraction of the time. Thus, its revenue 
with peering is 
TT^a，c) = ( l - a)/B(l)T + PBT — c. (2.9) 
2.5.4 Nash Bargaining Problem 
Next we model the bargaining problem based on the Nash Bargaining Solu-
tion [9], which abstracts away the procedures of bargaining between the two 
providers and considers only the set of outcomes. 
Definition 1. A peering strategy (q;*,c*) is a Nash bargaining solution if it 
solves the following problem: 
maximizeae[O,i],c F = C) - TTA) . c) - TTB) , (2.10) 
where TTA and TTB are the revenue obtained without peering as in (2.6) and 
(2-7). 
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The Nash Bargaining Solution is a unique solution that satisfies the axioms 
of Pareto efficiency, symmetry, invariance, and independence of irrelevant al- ‘ 
ternatives in a peering game. The meaning of these properties is explained as 
follows. 
• Pareto efficiency : There is no other outcome F(a, c) such that F{a, c) > 
• Symmetry : If the revenues without peering satisfies tt^ = TTB, we have 
C) = Max{{TT\{a, c ) - c ) — TXA)) = F{a\ c*). The prop-
erty assures that if the two providers are indistinguishable, the outcome 
will not discriminate between them. 
• Invariance : A linear transformation (O) of the two providers' revenue 
function with peering (7rJ(a, c) and tt备(a, c)) will not alter the outcome 
of the bargaining process. We have F{e{a*), Q{c*)) = Q(F{a*, c*)). 
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives : The solution only depends on 
the two determined variables {a and c). 
. It is clear that both providers should achieve revenues no worse than their 
non-peering revenues {i.e., TTA and TTB) at the Nash bargaining solution. Oth-
erwise, at least one of the two providers does not have the incentive to bargain. 
This means that a peering agreement can be achieved if and only if the follow-
ing condition holds: 
c ^ / z � + (1 — � > fA(l-/?) + + (pa — PB)(1 一 (3). (2.11) 
With a proper choice of c, condition (2.11) can ensure that both providers get 
better payoffs through peering. 
The optimal solution of (2.10) depends on the revenue functions /乂.）and 
fsi')- As an illustrative example, we consider linear advertisement revenue 
functions and assume f A � = UA - x and /^(a:) = ke - x. Higher values of 
1-
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kA and ks lead to higher values of advertisement revenue with the same user 
coverage. Next we summarize the optimal solution of (2.10) depending on 
three possible relationships between kA and ks, with detailed proofs given in 
Appendix A.l. 
Scenario 1. kA = ks-
In this case, both providers have the same advertisement revenue function. 
The advertisements from both advertisers are equally important. If we plug 
kA = ks into condition (2.11), then the left hand side (LHS) equals k^ and 
the right hand side (RHS) equals /CA + (PA - PB)(1 — P). Since PA > PB, we 
know that the LHS actually is less than RHS, and thus condition (2.11) does 
not hold. This means that providers will not choose to peer in this case. This 
is because the peering can not generate more advertisement revenue. Instead, 
due to all of provider A's users switching to the weaker provider B, the total 
subscription fees received from the two providers are less compared with the 
fees without peering. Hence, the total revenues will be less after peering. In 
return, the two providers have no incentive to peer. 
Scenario 2. kA > ks-
In this case, provider A has a stronger ability in generating advertisement 
revenue than B. We can show that the optimal advertising strategy is a* = 1, 
in which both providers deliver the same advertisement originally belonging 
to provider A. With a* = 1, condition (2.11) becomes 
KA > KA{L -13) + ksP + {PA - PB){1 - P), . 
which means that the subscription fees pa and pb need to satisfy 
(kA - ksW 
P A - P B < ^ \ _ l ' (2.12) 
so that the providers want to peer. When the providers want to peer, we can 
further show that the optimal payment strategy c* from provider B to provider 
) 
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A is 
c* = liiPA +P5)(1 - P ) - {kA + kB)0) . T, (2.13) ‘ 
which can be either positive or negative. For example, if the revenue income is 
much larger than the user subscription fee, i.e., + > {PA+PB){1-
then c* < 0. The negative value of c* means that provider A should com-
pensate B to stick to the peering. This is because provider A，s increase in 
advertisement income with peering is much larger than provider B，s revenue 
increase by getting more subscribers. Then provider A should share the addi-
tional income with B. Otherwise, provider B has no incentive to purchase A's 
content. 
Scenario 3. Au < 
In this case, provider A has a weaker capability in generating advertisement 
revenue than B. We can show that the optimal advertising strategy is a* = 0’ 
. in which the two providers deliver their own advertisements. With a* = 0, 
condition (2.11) becomes 
K B � - � ) + keP + {PA - PB){1 -
which is equivalent to 
PA -PB < KE - KA, (2.14) 
which can be satisfied under proper values of PA and PB- When the providers 
want to peer, we can further show that the optimal payment strategy c* from 
provider B to provider A is 
= + ke +Pi +P2){1 - P ) ' T > 0 . (2.15) 
In this case, provider A loses all the subscribers and can not get any adver-
tisement and users' subscription revenues. As a result, the payment c* should 
be positive and provider B should compensate A's loss. Otherwise, provider 
A has no incentive to peer. 
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Scenario 2 and 3 show that if the providers have different advertisement 
revenue functions, the peering will be desirable. This is because that the two 
providers can peer through proper advertisement arrangement, so that they 
can generate more advertisement revenue. When this increase of advertise-
ment revenues is larger than the loss of the total subscription fees, the two 
providers will peer. Otherwise, there will be no peering no matter who deliver 
whose advertisement. As for the advertisement strategy during peering, we 
have proved that who has stronger ability in generating advertisement revenue 
will contributes more to the total advertisement revenues, and in return, the 
stronger provider has the power to determine the optimal advertisement strat-
egy. Thus, the stronger provider can receive more revenues during peering and 
need to compensate the cooperator and share the additional income. 
The analysis of other advertisement revenue functions {i.e., convex or con-
cave functions) is similar as the methodology used in linear function situation. 
We would like to further discuss them in Section 4.1. 
Chapter 3 
Impact of Dynamic Content 
In this chapter, we consider how a provider can change its coverage (and thus 
the revenue) by introducing some special content {i.e., content with a very 
high quality) over a short time period. Without loss of generality, we assume 
provider A introduces the special content with a high quality q, > QA in the 
first time slot. ‘ 
‘ However, introducing (purchasing) a special content in one time slot needs 
additional budget from the provider. We consider two ways for introducing 
the special content. The first one is that provider A has some additional fund 
• and wants to make use of it to increase its revenue. It invests this additional 
fund for certain special content without decreasing other contents quality of 
the remaining (T — 1) time slots. The other case is provider A has a finite 
budget. Introducing the special content will decrease the content quality of the 
remaining (T - 1) time slots. The first case considers the effect of incremental 
budget change. The second case is a special case of a generalization of our 
problem where providers can use content choice as a strategy. 
This dynamic change in content quality will alter the content payoff for 
users. Thus, it will induce some users to switch the service providers. However, 
when users subscribe the service, they need to sign a contract of duration T ‘ 
with the providers and commit to pay for the whole contract. Therefore, if 
users want to switch to other providers, they will not enjoy the remaining 
23 
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contents and incur a switching cost if the original contract is terminated early 
13]. We characterize users with different remaining contract time z, which is 
uniformly distributed between [0,T] by assumption. This assumption comes 
from the fact that users may subscribe to providers at different time and thus 
have various remaining contract time. Then, the switching cost will be the 
subscription fee times the remaining contract time, Pi . z for both i = A and 
i = B. 
Next, we will discuss the impact of dynamic content and switching cost 
based on the two budget cases, and show their influences on providers' cover-
ages and revenues. 
3.1 Additional Investment for Dynamic Con-
tent 
3.1.1 Content Change 
In this case, provider A spends an additional fund on purchasing the special 
content. This spending does not come from the original budget for regular 
contents. Thus, the introduction of special content will not affect the qualities 
of other contents. Figure 3.1 illustrates one example of this change in content 
quality, where QA and QB are the regular content quality of provider A and B. 
3.1.2 Change of Coverage 
This variation in content over time causes users to switch. Users will make 
their decisions based on the content quality of the next T time slots. Once 
they switch the provider, they can achieve more payoff from the new provider 
J 
in the next T time slots and thus have on incentive to switch again during the 
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Figure 3.1: Example of dynamic content in Additional Investment Case 
T time slots^ . 
Apparently, the number of switching users depends on the magnitude of 
extra content benefit and users' switching cost. We will discuss how these two 
parameters affect users' choice of providers in the following. 
Switching users of Provider A 
Now，let us consider if any user wants to switch from provider A to provider 
B- Recall that the utility of the next T time slots of a user subscribing to 
provider A is 
T 
UA,static = 沪 - � a - PAT 
t=i 
before introducing the special content and 
T 
UA,dynamic = OQs + 炉-、八 _ PAT 
t=2 
1 Actually, users can switch multiple times during the T time slots. Their switching -
decisions are based on the utility they achieve for next T time slots. Thus, the number of 
switching users at time t’te(l’...，T) depends on the providers' content utility in [t, t+T] 
which IS related to the future content choice of providers. The peering problem of multiple 
switching times is more complicated. The present study will give a preliminary analysis to 
investigate users' switching decisions and their influence on providers. 
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after introducing the special content. The utility change is 
UAdynamic — UA,static = ^{QS ~ QA) > 0 
This means that provider A offers higher content utility and user will get more 
benefit for the next T time slots if sticking to A. Thus, no users will switch 
from provider A to B during the T time slots. 
Switching users of Provider B 
On the other hand, some original subscribers of provider B might want to 
switch to provider A due to the extra value of the special content. 
As users have different switching cost and different preferences on contents 
quality and their availability, they are distributed in these three dimensions 
(z, 9 and 6). Therefore, we can first figure out the size of switching users 
Sa2B in terms of 9 and 6 for certain switching cost. Then, we will find out 
the boundary cost ps . ZA2B under which users will pay to switch. Lastly, by 
integrating SA2B over z with z < ZA2B^ the total number of switching users for 
next T time slots is found out. 
Following the above procedures, we will first find out the users with what 
value of 0 and 5 will pay the cost to switch. A user will only switch from 
provider B to provider A if his utility of next T time slots improves after the 
switching, i.e., 
T T 
e{qs + ^ S'-'QA)-VA'T-VB'Z>eY,炉-1 貼-PB-T. (3.1) 
t=2 t=l 
Then, users who are indifferent in terms of switching to provider A or staying 
with provider B have a parameter OB2A{S, Z.Qs) that satisfies, i.e., 
z, q,) 二 T ^ T . ， 3.2 
(QS + Et=2 ^qa) - Et=i ^'-'QB 
which is shown by two dimensions of 0 and 6 in Fig 3.2 (with z = 0.5). Here 
we need to have 6 > otherwise no user with this switching cost 
will switch from provider B to A. 
I 
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Figure 3.2: Switching users without peering in Additional Investment Case 
、 
We observe that users with parameter (0, S) above the boundary z, q^) 
will choose provider A. In fact, all users who are above the curve choose 
. provider A even without the special content. Only users who are below the 
curve and above the curve 0B2A(S,z,g,) are the switching users. The 
gray area SB2A denotes the size of switching users. We further observe that 
• switching users have a large value of 9 and a small value of 5. This is because 
these users value the content utility and its availability more. So they can 
achieve more utility from switching to provider A. Furthermore, users below 
the boundary Qs) will stick to the original providers (either A or B). 
Besides, we notice that 9B2AiS,z,q,) is a decreasing function of S. As 
provider A increases the total contents' utility, more users with large S who 
value future content as current content will chooses provider A. In additional, 
function 0B2A{S,z,q,) decreases in the special content quality q^ . It means 
that the line 0B2A{S,z,qs) will move downwards if q^  increases. Thus, more 
users will switch and the gray area will expand. The higher the quality of 
special content is, the higher utility the users can obtain. Then, more users 
will switch. So from provider v4，s view, it would like to spend its additional 
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Figure 3.3: Relationship between 6{S, z, QS) and z 
fund to enhance the content quality and increase its coverage. 
However, as the switching cost increases, fewer users will pay such a high 
cost to switch. Next, we will find out the threshold value of ZAIB, with which 
the switching users are indifferent from staying with B or switching to A. 
We observe that function 6B2A{^ ,么，Qs) 
increases in z. Fewer users with large 
z will switch and the gray area will reduce. This is because they only need 
to pay a small cost and they can receive more content payoff from switching. 
When z increases to zb2A^ there is no switching users and the gray area reduces 
to one point, which is represented by the point of 9{5, ZB2A, QS)-
Thus, Let 6*{5) equal to 0b2a{S, z, QS), which is 
{PA -PB)T _ {PA-PB)T-\-PB-Z 
E L 炉-1 似力—E L 炉 — f c + s^-^qa) - E l l S t � • ( ) . 
Substituting 5 = 0 into (3.3), we have 
PB QA - QB 、 ' 
For users with z > ZBIA, their benefit from switching is less than the large 
switching cost they pay even after A introduced the special content. Hence, 
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they will not switch. For users with z < users with large 0 and small 6 
illustrated in Fig 3.2 who can afford the cost will switch. 
Therefore, the total number of switching users from 5 to is the integra-
tion of SB2A in terms of z with z < ZB2A, which is 
Sn = 厂 ' 举 dz, (3.5) 
These switching users will receive higher content utility for the next T time 
slots. Therefore, they have no incentive to reconsider their subscription choice 
during the T time slots. 
Let 7 denote the coverage of provider B after A introducing special content. 
Then, the coverages for the two providers without peering are 
A，s coverage : 1 - 7 = 1 - /? + 
B's coverage : 7 = -
Timing of Special Content 
Now, we will discuss the effect of placement of special content during the con-
• tract time. As the regular content quality will not decrease, users of provider 
乂 will still achieve higher content utility even the special content is placed at 
the last time slot T. So A，s original subscribers will not switch. In contrast, 
for provider B,s users, the benefit is not so much as the case when special 
content is placed at the first time slot. So fewer users will switch. But this 
does not change the insight of users' switching decisions. Next we will focus on 
tiie case that the special content is placed at the first time slot. The analysis 
for other cases is similar and will not be covered. 
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3.1.3 Providers' Revenue 
The two providers' revenues after provider A introducing the special content 
are as follows: ‘ 
兀 As = C / U ( 1 - 7 ) + P a . ( 1 - 7 ) ) . T， (3.6) 
t^ Bs = (3.7) 
3.2 Finite Budget for Dynamic Content 
3.2.1 Content Change 
In this case, provider A has finite budget and no additional fund to increase 
content quality. But it can also introduce the special content with decreasing 
other content quality to g二 for the remaining (T — 1) time slots. 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the budget and the content quality 
has a linear relationship. Then, the finite budget constraint means that 
gs + g A ( ^ - l ) = gAT. (3.8) 
Figure 3.4 illustrates one example of the change of content after provider A 
introducing the special content by finite budget. Where qA is the static content 
quality of provider A without special content. 
3.2.2 Change of Coverage 
The dynamic contents of provider A will also change users' content utility and 
induce some to pay the switching cost to switch. Users will make their choice 
of subscription according to the change of contents and their switching cost 
when the special content comes. 
Next, we will discuss how the finite budget of provider, the special content 
and the switching cost affect users' choice of subscription in details. 
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Figure 3.4: Example of dynamic content in Finite Budget Case 
Switching Users of Provider A 
Recall that the utility of a user subscribing to provider A is 
. T 
UA,static = 炉—1 似 — P A T 
t=i 
before introducing the special content and 
T 
U'A,dynamic = % + … 心 — P A T 
t=2 
after introducing the special content in finite budget case. The utility change 
is ‘ 
^A,dynamic — UA,static 
二 eqs + e j y - � ' A — ejy-iqA 
t=2 t=l 
( T \ 
=OU-QA + Y.^'-' {q'A-QA) ~ 
\ t=2 J 
= 0 . 
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The inequality follows from 6 < 1 and q'^ < qa, and the last equality follows 
from (3.8). This means that provider A provides higher content utility and 
user will get more benefit if sticking to A. Thus, no users will switch from 
provider ^ to ^ in this case, which is the same as in additional investment 
case. 
Switching Users of Provider B 
On the other hand, some original subscribers of provider B might want to 
switch to provider A due to the special content. The analysis of figuring out 
provider B's switching users is similar with the method used in Section 3.1.2. 
Thus, we will skip the details of proof and give the results directly. 
Then, users who are indifferent in terms of switching to provider A or 
staying with provider B in this finite budget case have a parameter 0 equals 
to 
‘ ( ， , � — f e + E二2 炉 警 EL � (3-9) 
which is shown by two dimensions of 6 and S in Fig 3.5 (with z = 0.5). Here 
we need to have 6 > otherwise no user will switch from B to 
A. The gray area S'B2A denotes this portion of switching users in finite budget 
case. 
We also notice that users who incur a small switching cost and value current 
content and its availability more will switch, which is similar with the switching 
users in additional investment case. 
However, comparing equation (3.2) with (3.9), as provider A's regular con-
tent quality decreases to g乂，the value of 9B2A{S, Z, QS) in additional investment 
case is less than the value of qs) in finite budget case under the same 
special content quality. It means that more users will switch in the former 
case than in the latter case. The reason is that provider A spends more bud-
get other than the original budget in the additional investment case to increase 
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Figure 3.5: Switching users without peering in Finite Case 
content quality.' Moreover, the higher the special content quality is, the lower 
the regular contents quality is in finite case. Hence, the difference between the 
‘ two values of 0b2A and e'B2A is larger, which leads to larger difference of the 
number of switching users. 
The method of calculation of the size of switching users is also similar with 
• the methodology used in Section 3.1.2. Thus, we would like to skip the details 
also and present the results straightly. 
As the most likely switching users {5 = 0) do not care the future contents 
quality, the threshold value of z depends only on the special content quality, 
which means that the value of Zb2A is the the same in both budget cases. 
Therefore, the total number of switching users from B to A in finite case is 
S , 厂 广 、 心 . (3-10) 
Let 7' denote the coverage of provider B after A introducing special content 
in finite budget case. Then, the coverages for the two providers without peering 
/ 
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are 
A's coverage : 1 - 7' = 1 - + 
B's coverage : 7' = ^ — 
Timing of Special Content 
Now, let us discuss the influence of placement of special content for this budget 
case. The choice of provider B's users is similar as the one in additional 
investment case, where users make their decision based on the valuation of 
special content quality and the switching cost they incur. However, some 
original subscribers of provider A will switch to B as the regular content quality 
has decreased. The placement of special content will affect A's users switching 
decisions, which is different from the case in additional investment case. 
Taking the extreme case for example that the special content is placed at 
the last time slot T, the benefit of special content is not obtained immediately. 
So users who incur a small switching cost and value current content quality 
more will switch to provider B. Thus, from the provider's perspective, it 
should try to avoid decreasing current content quality. Therefore, the provider 
will use the future budget to introduce the special content and thus will not 
affect the current users' subscription. That means providers introduce the 
special content at the first time slot and decrease future content quality in 
finite budget case, whereby the special content holder will not lose users, and 
can attract as many users as possible instead. The following analysis focuses 
on the case that the special content will be introduced at the first time slot. 
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3.2.3 Providers' Revenue 
The two providers' revenues after A introducing special content in finite budget 
case are as follows 
4 = C/U(l — — ( 3 . 1 1 ) 
4 = (3.12) 
Summary 
Obviously, the special content can give an advantage to the content right holder 
(provider A) in both budget cases. It helps the provider to attract users who 
value current content quality more and only need to pay a small switching cost. 
The higher quality the special content is, the larger the number of switching 
users will be. The switching users have increased provider A's coverage and 
. thus contributed to A's increasing revenues. Besides, there are more users 
switching the provider in additional budget case than in finite budget case. 
The reason is that provider A spends more budget other than the original 
• budget in the former case. In contrast, in the latter case, provider A aims to 
increasing its coverage by choosing contents and using the current resources. 
As for the switching cost, it plays a lock-in effect and helps providers to 
keep their subscribers. Users with long unfinished contract time will incur a 
large switching cost. This kind of users is not easy to change their provider. 
Thus, the providers would like to sign a long time contract with users. So it 
can decrease users' incentive to switch even other providers introduce some 
high quality contents. On the other hand, users with short unfinished contract 
time only need to pay a small switching cost. They are easier to switch the 
providers. Thus, they would like to sign a short time period of contract with 
the providers. Then, they can be more flexile to choose the providers. So they 
can increase their payoff by switching multiple times. 
/ 
Chapter 4 
Peeing in Dynamic Model 
In this section, we will study how the introduction of dynamic content changes 
the providers' incentive to peer. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are two ways for introducing the spe-
cial content: additional investment and finite budget. In both cases, the two 
providers can peer over either T time slots or just over the special content 
time. Combing these two aspects leads to four scenarios in Table 4.1. 
Additional Investment Case Finite Budget Case 
Peering over T time slots I 11 
Peering over one time slot I I I I V 
Table 4.1: Peering scenarios in Dynamic Content Model 
For scenarios (III) and (IV), the two providers only peer over one time slot 
during which the special content is introduced at Provider A. For scenarios (I) 
and (II), the format of peering agreement is similar as the static content case, 
i.e., over the advertisement ratio a and payment c. 
• As the analysis methodology of peering incentive in finite budget case is 
similar with the analysis used in additional investment case, we will first in-
vestigate scenario (I) and (III) in details for additional investment case, and 
then discuss the peering incentive for scenario (II) and (IV). 
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4.1 Peering over T Time Slots 
4.1.1 Content Change, Advertisement Sharing, and Pay-
ment 
As provider A has better contents, both providers deliver A's contents as il-
lustrated in Fig 4.1. 
101—_ I — I 1 1 1 1 1—-—I 1 
9 ~ ^ -
8 • -
7 qA 
6 - i — 
CT" 5 • (qs’ qA) for provider A and B 
_ 4 • -
3 - -
2 - -
‘ 1 • -
o' ‘ 1 1 1~——I 1 1 I I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 . 6 7 8 9 10 
T 
• Figure 4.1: The common contents of both providers when peering over T time 
slots 
As for the advertisement arrangement, provider A will deliver its own ad-
vertisement. Provider B delivers a portion of A's advertisement and (1 — a) 
portion of its own advertisement. Meanwhile, B pays provider A a one-time 
payment c for the one time slot peering. Two providers need to bargain over 
the advertisement splitting ratio a and the payment c similarly as described 
in Figures 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5. 
4.1.2 Change of Coverage " 
As both providers have the same contents, no users will switch from provider B 
to A as they can access the same high quality contents with provider B while 
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paying a low monthly subscription fee. On the other hand, some existing 
subscribers of provider A will switch to B if the benefit in terms of reduced 
subscription fee is larger than the switching cost, i.e.,， 
{PA - VB)T > PAZ 
which is equivalent to 
^ < ( 1 - — ) - T (4.1) 
PA \ ) 
Let us define za2b 三(1 —器 ) . T . Then, users with z > za2B will incur a 
large switching cost and thus will not switch and stay with provider A for the 
next T time slots. On the other hand, users with z < ZA2B only need to pay a 
small cost and thus they will switch to provider B. 
L e t � d e n o t e the new coverage of provider B after providers peering over 
T time slots in dynamic model. Then, the coverages for the two providers with 
peering are 
^'s coverage : 1 - tJ = (1 - / ? ) • (1 - (4.2) 
5 ' s coverage : 7J = ^ + (1 - • (4.3) 
4.1.3 Providers' Revenue 
The two providers' revenues after peering are as follows: 
7r5> , c ) = ( ^ 4 � + ( 1 - q O / a ( 1 - 7 D + P A ( 1 - 7 D ) . T + C， 
兀 = ((1 - A)FB(7C) +PB ‘ 7C) - T - C . 
4.1.4 Nash Bargaining Problem 
Now, let us solve the bargaining problem in this dynamic content model us-
ing the Nash Bargaining solution, which satisfies several appealing i)r()p(nti(3s 
illustrated in Section 2.5. -- > 
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Definition 2. A peering strategy (a*, c*) is a Nash bargaining solution if it 
solves the following problem: . 
maximizece[o,I],c ( 兀 c ) — T T A S ) . — TTBS) , (4 .4) 
where ttas and ttbs cire the revenues obtained without peering as in (3.6) and 
(3.7). I 
Each providers should achieve a revenue no worse than its non-peering 
revenue, otherwise it does not have incentive to bargain. This means that 
peering will take place if and only if 
7rJ“a, c) + c) > tt^ s + TTBS, (4.5) 
under which it is always possible to choose a proper value of payment c to 
increase the revenues of both providers. 
. We notice that both (4.4) and (2.10) are functions of a and c. Therefore, 
the optimal solution of (4.4) can be solved using a similar methodology as in 
Section 2.5. 
Not surprisingly, the solution depends on the advertisement functions /於） 
and /b(-). Next we also use linear advertisement revenue functions as an 
illustrated example, i.e., fA{x) = kAX and /^(a;) = ICBX, which are further 
used for the discussion in Section 4.2.4. Higher values of the linear coefficients 
‘ kA and ks lead to higher values of advertisement revenue with the same user 
coverage. We have three cases depending on the relationship between k^ and 
ks. The detailed proofs can be found to in Appendix A.2 
Scenario 1. kA = ks-
In this case, two providers have the equal capability of generating the a d - " 
vertisement revenue. Plugging ICA = ks into condition (4.5) and we get 
> 0 . (4.6) 
、-
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Since subscription fess PA > PB and coverages 7 < 7J, condition (4.6)cannot 
be satisfied. Thus, providers will not peer in this case. 
Scenario 2. kA > J^ b-
In this case, provider A has a higher capability of generating the advertise-
ment revenue. We can show that the optimal advertising strategy is a* = 1, 
under which condition (4.5) becomes 
PA-PB< {kA - ke). ， (4.7) 
Ic ~ 1 
which can be satisfied under proper subscription fees. 
Comparing (4.7) with the corresponding condition (2.12) in the static case, 
both peering conditions depend on satisfying proper relationship between PA -
PB and KA - KS- In both models, the overall subscription revenues of both 
providers will decrease with peering as some users will switch to provider B 
with the lower subscription fee. To counter balance this, the two providers 
need to generate more total advertisement revenues so that both providers can 
be better off (with a proper payment transfer c). 
Furthermore, we notice that the peering incentive depends on the provider 
B's coverage before and after peering, i.e., 7 and 7J. In the case where the 
special content is introduced at Provider A and there is no peering (see Sec-
tion 3)，the number of users switching from B to A increases with the special 
content quality QS, which means that provider A's coverage (1 — 7) increases. 
Then, the right hand side of (4.5) will increases. On the other hand, from 
(4.1), we observe the number of switching users will not change with & during 
peering as both providers deliver the same content. It means that provider A's 
coverage (1 - 7J) with peering does not change. Therefore, the left hand side 
of (4.5) will not change. Therefore, (4.5) is harder satisfied, whereby providers' 
peering incentive is lower when the special content quality increases. 
When (4.7) is satisfied and the providers choose to peer, we can show that 
f • 
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the optimal payment strategy c* from provider B to provider A is 
c* = • {{PA + PBXII - 7) - {kA + k s h ) . T, (4.8) 
which can be either positive or negative. The insight of the value of c* can be 
referred the discussion in Section 2.5. 
Scenario 3. kA < ks-
In this case, provider B has a higher capability of generating advertisement 
revenue. We can show the optimal advertising strategy is a* 二 0, under which, 
condition (4.5) becomes 
P A - P B < KS - KA, (4 .9 ) 
which can be satisfied under proper values of PA and PB-
We note that the peering condition (4.9) is the same as the corresponding 
condition (2.14) in the static case. The special content quality QS does not 
affect the peering condition in this case. 
When providers choose to peer, we can show that the optimal payment c* 
from provider B to provider A is 
c* 二臺.(/CA + kB - 7) . r � 0 . (4.10) 
Discussion 
Now, let us discuss the.incentive of peering over T time slots of scenario (II), 
whereby provider A introduces the special content by finite budget. The anal-
ysis is similar with the methodology used in Section 4.1. 
As discussed in 4.1.4, the number of switching users only depends on the 
subscription fee and switching cost when providers choose to peer. Thus, the 
two providers' coverages after peering in finite budget case is the same as 
the coverages in additional investment case. The only difference is the two 
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providers' coverages before peering, which provider B's coverage is lareger in 
finite budget case, i.e., 7' > 7. 
Then, substituting the value of 7 by 7' into the peering conditions dis-
cussed in the three scenarios. We notice that the difference is for scenario that 
the special content holder A has a stronger ability in generating advertisement 
revenue. The condition in finite budget case is looser than in additional in-
vestment case. This is because the right hand side of (4.7) will decrease when 
7 increases to 7', which means the providers' peering condition is looser in 
finite budget case. This is because the left hand of (4.5) does not change and 
the right hand side of (4.5) has decreased in finite budget case, whereby 4.5) 
is easier satisfied. Then, providers' peering incentive is higher in finite budget 
case than in additional investment case. 
Other advertisement revenue functions 
Convex advertisement revenue function 
Here we consider convex advertisement revenue functions, and assume / ^ ( x ) = 
kA . and f s ix ) = ks . x"^ . Next we summarize the optimal solution of (4.4) 
depending on two possible relationships between Au and ks. The detailed 
proofs can be found in Appendix A.2. 
Scenario 1. kA> ks-
In this case, provider A has a no weaker capability of generating the adver-
. t isement revenue than provider B. We can show that the optimal advertising 
strategy is a* = 1, under which condition (4.5) becomes 
严 斤 (4.11) 
7c - 7 \ , 
which can be satisfied under proper subscription fees. 
* 
Chapter ^ Peeing in Dynamic Model 43' 
When (4.11) is satisfied and the providers choose to peer, we can show that 
the optimal payment strategy c* from provider B to provider A is 
= i {{PA + P B M — 7) + {kA — K E H — S/C^T) • T, (4.12) 
which can be either positive or negative. The meaning of the value of c* can 
be referred the discussion in Section 2.5. 
Scenario 2. kA < ks-
In this case, provider A has a weaker capability of generating advertisement 
revenue. The choice of users will affect the peering strategy. 
• 7J = Ij^lj-: Condition (4.5) can not be satisfied. This is because the two 
providers can not generate more advertisement revenue during peering. 
Then providers will not peer. 
• f j ^ < 7 � < 1: It means that if more users switch to provider B, 
the optimal advertising strategy should be that the two providers deliver 
the same advertisement {a* = 1). Therefore, the peering condition and 
payment is the same as in case of kA > ks-
• 0 < < It means that if fewer users switch and more users 
stay with provider A, the optimal advertising strategy is that the two 
providers deliver their own advertisement (ce* 二 0). The peering condi-
tion becomespa-Pb < ks(7�+ 7) — — 7 � — 7 ) ’ where the payment 
becomes c* = | ( (p4+p5) (7�—7) + (71—7)(A^s(7�+7)+A :a(2—7�-7))). 
We find that in the case of convex advertisement revenue function, providers 
have a higher incentive to deliver the content holder's advertisement. Convex 
revenue function means that there exists a phenomenon of scale of economies in .. 
market share, which providers can benefit much more from lager users coverage. 
Thus, providers can generate more total revenue through proper advertisement 
arrangement, whereby providers will peer under proper subscription fees. 
Chapter ^ Peeing in Dynamic Model 44' 
Concave advertisement revenue function 
Here we consider concave advertisement revenue functions, and assume JA = 
-kA{x — 1)2 + kA and = - k s i x — 1)2 + ks. Again, we summarize the 
optimal solution of (4.4) depending on two possible relationships between /c^  
and ks. The detailed proofs can be found in Appendix A.2 
Scenario 1. kA < ks-
In this case, provider A has a no stronger capability of generating the adver-
tisement revenue than provider B. We can show that the optimal advertising 
strategy is a* = 0,, under which condition (4.5) becomes 
V A - V B < KB{2 - 7 � 一 7) - KAILL + 7), (4.13) 
which can be satisfied under proper subscription fees. 
When (4.13) is satisfied and the providers choose to peer, we can show that 
the optimal payment strategy c* from provider B to provider A is 
c* = 5 ((PA -HPS)(7C - 7) + (7C - 7 ) ( K A ( 7 C + 7) + A；^ (2 - 7J - 7))) ' T, (4.14) 
which can be either positive. Provider B need to compensate A. 
Scenario 2. kA > ks-
In this case, provider A has a stronger capability of generating advertise-
ment revenue. Then, the choice of users will affect the peering strategy. 
• = Condition (4.5) can not be satisfied. This is because the two 
providers can not generate more advertisement revenue during peering. 
Then providers will not peer. 
‘ • < t J < 1： It means that if more users switch to provider B during 
peering, the optimal advertising strategy is that the two providers deliver 
different advertisement (a* = 0). The peering condition and payment is 
the same as in case of UA < ks-
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• 0 < 7J < It means that if fewer users switch to provider B, 
the optimal advertising strategy is that the two providers deliver the 
same advertisement {A* = 1). The peering condition becomes PA —PB < 
〜梦—2广7, where the payment is c* = | ((p^ + PBM — 7) — (^ U — 
ksH + 狄Bl) .T 
Also, we observe that in the case of concave advertisement revenue func-
tion, providers have a higher incentive to deliver their own advertisement. 
Concave revenue function means that providers can generate large advertise-
ment revenue by themselves, which providers would like to deliver their own 
advertisement. So providers can generate more total revenue and benefit from 
the peering under proper subscription fees. 
4.2 Peering over One Time Slot 
4.2.1 Content Change, Advertisement Sharing, and Pay-
ment 
In this case, both provider will deliver the special content during the first time 
slot as illustrated in Fig 4.2. After the first time slot, they will no longer peer 
with each other and thus will deliver their original contents for the rest T — 1 
time slots. . 
During the first time slot, provider A will deliver its own advertisement. 
Provider B delivers a portion of A's advertisement and (1 — a) portion of 
its own advertisement. Meanwhile, provider B pays provider A a one-time 
payment c for the one time slot peering. Two providers need to bargain over 
the advertisement splitting ratio a and the payment c similarly as described 
in Figures 2.3, 2.4，and 2.5. 
In the remaining T - 1 time slots, both providers will deliver their own 
advertisement without any payment transfer. 
I 
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Figure 4.2: Change of Contents with peering over one time slot 
4.2.2 Change of Coverage 
When two providers share the special content, no users will switch from provider 
召 to A as they can access the special content with provider B while paying a 
low monthly subscription fee. On the other hand, some existing subscribers of 
provider A will switch to B if the benefit in terms of reduced subscription fee 
is larger than the switching cost, i.e., 
T T 
0{qs + Yu 炉—1 貼 ) - P b ' T - P a ' Z > + ^ d'-'q^)-Pa'T, 
which is equivalent to 
z) z ( � — P b ) T -PA-Z 
� � L � E L � (4.15) 
Intuitively, those users who have small 6 values will care more about the 
monthly subscription fee than the content quality, and thus have the incentive 
to switch from provider A to provider B for the smaller monthly payment PB-
Condition (4.15)，of course, also depends on the remaining contract time z of 
the switching users {i.e., switching penalty). 
As we have ZA2B = (1 — ^ J T , ii z > •ZA2B, (4.15) does not hold as the right 
hand side is negative. This means that users with large switching cost will 
“ 
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stay with provider A and not switch. In the case of z < za2B, the right hand 
side of (4.15) becomes positive. In this case, users who do not value contents 
much (i.e., with small 9 values) will switch to provider B and enjoy a lower 
subscription fee. Users who are indifferent between switching to B and staying 
with A have a parameter Q at satisfies 
Qo 旧 一 {VA-VB)T-VA'Z 
which is shown in Fig 4.3 (with z = 0.5). 
R 
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Figure 4.3: Switching users with peering over one time slot 
Here we need to have 9 < 力，otherwise no user will switch from 
^ to B. For these users with 2： = 0.5, users with parameter ((9, J) on the left 
hand side of the boundary 没》之 )w i l l choose provider B. In fact, users 
who are below the curve 9* (6) choose provider B even without peering. Only 
users who are above the curve 6*{S) and on the left side of the curve 乂5，z) 
are the switching users. The gray area S^2B denotes the portion of switching 
users. 
We notice that the curve 没么2S(<^ ’ 么）decreases in terms of 6. The rea-
son is that users with smaller 6 value current content and subscription fee 
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more. Thus, more users are willing to switch. We further notice that function 
2：) decreases in z, i.e., the curve moves left with a larger value of z. 
The switching cost becomes larger and fewer users will switch. 
Assuming S^2b denote the size of the gray area. Thus, the total number 




Apparently, the number of switching users in this one time slot peering is 
smaller than the switching number in T time slots'peering，which is Sp < 
(1 — . This is because in the latter peering case, switching users make 
their decisions only based on the subscription fee and their switching cost. In 
contrast, in the former case, provider A offers higher content quality for the 
remaining (T - 1) time slots. Users make their decisions based on not only 
these two factors, but also their valuation for future content quality. Thus, 
fewer users switch in this one time slot peering. 
Let denote the coverage of provider B after the providers sharing the 
special content. Then, the coverages for the two providers with peering are 
A's coverage : 1 - 7? = (1 - /?) - Sp, (4.16) 
B,s coverage : = ^ + Sp. (4.17) 
4.2.3 Providers' Revenue 
The two providers' revenues after peering are as follows: 
7rg>，c) = ( l - a ) / B ( 7 c � ) + / B ( 7 ? ) C r - l ) 
+PB 'T-C. 
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The revenue of provider A equals to the summation of the peering advertise-
ment revenue for the first time slot, the advertisement revenue for the remain-
ing (T-1) time slots, the subscription revenues from users, and the payment c 
from provider B due to peering. Provider B's revenue is calculated similarly, 
except that it pays provider A instead of gets paid. 
Apparently, provider A，s coverage with peering is smaller than the coverage 
without peering (1 - < 1 — 7), while provider B has increased its coverage 
by peering. Therefore, the two providers need a proper advertisement splitting 
and transfer payment strategy to balance their interests. 
4.2.4 Nash Bargaining Problem 
Again, let us solve the bargaining problem in this dynamic content using the 
Nash Bargaining solution, which satisfies several appealing properties illus-
trated in Section 2.5. 
Definition 3. A peering strategy (a*, c*) is a Nash bargaining solution if it 
solves the following problem: 
maximizeaem,c c) - TTAS) . (Tr^a, O) — TTBS) ’ , (4.18) 
where TTAS and TTBS are the revenues obtained without peering as in (3.6) and 
(3.7) - • 
Also, each provider should achieve revenue no worse than its non-peering 
revenue, otherwise it does not have incentives to bargain. This means that 
peering will take place if and only if 
兀义(Q^  c) + 7rg“a, c) > TTAS + ttb,, (4.19) 
under which it is always possible to choose a proper value of payment c to 
increase the revenues of both providers. 
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We notice that problem (4.18) is function of a and c as problem (2.10) and 
(4.4) . Therefore, the optimal solution of (4.18) can be solved using a similar 
methodology as in Section 2.5. 
By using the illustrated linear advertisement revenue functions in Sec-
tion 4.1.4, we have three cases depending on the relationship between kA and 
ks- The detailed proofs are given in Appendix A.3. The analysis of other ad-
vertisement revenues functions {i.e., convex or concave functions) is similar as 
the methodology used in linear function, which can be referred to Section 4.1. 
Scenario 1. kA — ks-
In this case, two providers have the equal capability of generating the ad-
vertisement revenue. Plugging UA = ks into condition (4.19) and we get 
{VA — PB) . (7 - 7C) > 0’ which can not be satisfied as PA > VB and 7 < 
Thus, providers will not peer. 
Scenario 2. kA > ks-
In this case, provider A has a higher capability of generating the advertise-
ment revenue. We can show that the optimal advertising strategy is a* = 1, 
under which condition (4.19) becomes 
(7-T-7?(T-1)) 
P A - V B < {KA - M . _ 你 - (4.20) 
which can be satisfied under proper subscription fees. 
We observe that the contract time can not be too large, i.e., T < ； 
Otherwise, (4.20) can not be satisfied. This is because the two providers just ‘ 
I 
peer over one time slot, provider A has lost coverage and its advertisement 
can not cover provider B’s users over the remaining ( T - 1) time slots. Then, 
provider A will lose revenues after sharing the special content. The larger the 
value of T is, the more revenue provider A will lose in the remaining (T — 1) 
time slots. Hence, provider A need to balance its interest between current 
* fcfc 
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and future revenues. This is different from the case of peering over T time 
slots, where provider A does not need to consider the future revenue effect 
as providers also peer over the remaining (T — 1) time slots. Therefore, the 
contract time T plays an important role in deciding providers' peering decision. 
When T > both providers have no incentive to peer. ‘ 
When (4.7) is satisfied and providers choose to peer, we can show that the 
optimal payment strategy c* from provider B to provider A is 
= ^ ((kA + kB)(7^(T - 1) — JT) + (PA + - 7)T) . (4.21) 
Scenario 3. k^ < ks-
In this case, provider A has a lower capability of generating the advertise-
ment revenue. We can show that the optimal advertising strategy is a* = 0, 
under which condition (4.19) becomes . 
. PA-PB < KB - KA, (4.22) 
which can be satisfied under proper values of PA and PB-
We notice that condition (4.22) in one time slot peering, condition (4.9) 
in T time slots' peering, and condition (2.14) in the static case are the same. 
The explanation why they are the same can be found in Section 4.1.4. 
When providers choose to peer, we can show that the optimal payment 
strategy c* from provider B to provider A is 
c* = ^ • + ks + P A + P B ) b ? — 7) • T � 0 . (4.23) 
Discussion 
Now, let us discuss the incentive of peering over one time slot of scenario 
(IV), whereby provider A introduces the special content by finite budget. The 
analysis is similar with the methodology used in Section ??. The only difference 
is the two providers' coverages, which will change the peering condition slightly. 
Chapter ^ Peeing in Dynamic Model 52' 
As discussed in 3.2, provider B's coverage is before peering and ( after 
peering. And we have 7'�"^ as fewer users will switch to A, and > as 
provider B can attract more users due to the due to the decreasing quality of 
provider A's regular content in finite case. 
Then, substituting these two news values (7' and j f ) into the values of 
(7 and ) discussed in the three peering scenarios. The difference is for 
the scenario that the special content holder A has a stronger ability in gen-
erating advertisement revenue. We find that the peering condition becomes 
T < • Thus, providers need to take the future revenue into when peering 
over one time slot. When T > ： ^ ^ , both providers have no incentive to peer. 
Chapter 5 
Summary and Future Work 
In content delivering market, network content providers aim to increase their 
market shares and revenues. The content popularity and market coverage have 
significant impacts on a network content provider's revenue. Thus, the goal 
of the present study is to characterize the popularity as the content quality 
through the analysis of how provider's peering can affect content quality they 
offer and change their market coverage. The findings identify the peering 
conditions and optimal peering strategies for sharing contents. 
Firstly, a static baseline model is considered, whereby network content 
providers have static content and do not cooperate. In this case, we derive 
the coverage of the providers based on the quality of the contents and user 
subscription fees. Subsequently, peering and content sharing are considered 
as means of helping providers to improve their revenues. The key insight is 
that peering will be desirable when the providers' total revenue is increased 
and properly shared by inter-provider financial transfers. In the case of linear 
advertisement functions, peering will take place when providers have different 
abilities in generating advertisement revenue and set subscription fees properly. 
Moreover, the provider with stronger ability to generate advertisement revenue 
will contribute more to the total advertisement revenues. Then, the stronger 
provider has the power to determine the optimal advertisement strategy. 
Secondly, the dynamic content model is considered, whereby a provider can 
53 
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introduce some high quality special content for a short period of time in order 
to attract users. Two cases of the special content budget sources are discussed: 
additional investment and finite budget. The findings indicate that the budget 
sources, the special content timing, the switching cost, the valuation of content, 
and time discount factor all play important roles in deciding the benefit of 
special content. The special content can give a competitive advantage to the 
content right holder (provider A in this study) in both cases. It helps the 
provider to attract users who incur a small switching cost and value content 
quality and its availability more. Moreover, there are more users switching 
the provider in additional budget case than in finite budget case. The reason 
is that provider A spends more budget other than the original budget in the 
former case. In contrast, in the latter case, provider A aims to increasing its 
coverage by choosing contents and using the current resources. 
Lastly, we consider the peering incentive in dynamic content model and 
compare the optimal peering strategy with the the one in static content case. 
Two peering agreements for additional investment case are first analyzed: Peer-
ing over T time slots and Peering over One time slot. We discuss different 
advertisement revenue functions and present providers' peering incentive. In 
the case of linear advertisement revenue function, the findings show that the 
difference between static model and the two peering cases in dynamic model 
is for the scenario that the special content right holder has a stronger ability 
in generating advertisement revenue. For peering over T time slots case, the 
peering condition is stricter if the special content quality increases. Then, we 
identify that the peering incentive in finite budget case is higher than in ad-
ditional case. While for peering over one time slot case, we show that when 
providers consider the future revenues more in both special content budget 
cases, their peering incentive is lower. 
There are several ways to extend this work. One direction is to consider the 
case where both providers can purchase special contents. Then, it is possible for 
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users to switch the service providers multiple times. These users will engage 
in a content utility maximization problem according to the special contents 
quality, the providers' regular contents quality and subscription fees over the 
T time slots. Similarly, the providers need to reconsider their peering strategy 
based on users' reaction. They will engage in a game theoretical interaction in 
terms of the timing, content quality, the amount of special content and users' 
behavior. The other direction is to consider the strategic interactions between 
advertisers and content providers. For example, a case where an advertiser 
has the choice to work with more than one content provider to maximize its 
revenue should be considered. They will choose a provider based on its cover-
age and price for advertisement. Advertisers' choice will influence the network 
content providers' capability in generating advertisement revenues and peering 
incentive with other providers. Thus, when peering, the providers should not 
only consider the effect on users, but also the effect on advertisers when peer-
ing. Finally, as a part of the present study, the strategy by which the providers 
can jointly optimize the subscription fees with the contents to become more 
attractive in the market will be considered. Since a lower subscription fee 
• can attract more users, when one of the network providers introduces special 
content, the content right holder attains a competitive advantage. The other 
providers need to find out some way to retain their market share and standing. 
Thus, in this case, increasing content quality and decreasing subscription fee 
will be viable options. It will be interesting to investigate this joint optimiza-
tion problem of the providers. 
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Proof of Optimal Peering 
Strategy 
I 
A. l Proof of Static Optimal Peering Strategy 
The maximization problem for (2.10) is not a convex optimization problem. 
However, we can transform problem (2.10) into the following equivalent mini-
mization problem: 
• minimizec,e[o,i],c F(c, a) = - log ( ( 7 r � ( a ’ c) - TTA) . c) - t t s ) ) , (A . l ) 
We first show that the above minimization problem is a convex minimiza-
tion problem with respect to c and a. Then, we use the KKT necessary and 
sufficient conditions to find out the optimal solutions for (A.l). 
It is clear that the constraint set in above minimization problem is convex. 
To prove function F(c, a) is jointly convex, we just need to show that the 
Hessian of the function is positive semi-definite, i.e., 
沪厂 d^F 
H(F(C,QO) = ^ ^ >-0. (A.2) 
_ dcda d'^a _ 
The Hessian of (A.2) is positive semi-definite if ^ > 0, f f > 0 and f f • 
裝 — > 0. By calculating the derivatives of F function, we have the 
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following results: 
d'^F T2 r2 
瓦 二 (兀》 - 7 0 1 ) 2 + {7T% — TTB)' - 0， 
^ = WaOW . IMllZZ >n 
— (TT^ - T T力2 十 的 _ 兀 - U’ 
d'F = f A � . T fsW-T 
碰 _ ( 兀 卜 兀 十 K - — 2 ， 
thus: 
竺 护 F . d'F 二 （(/^) - /b⑴)r)2 ^ 
炉 c d^a ^dadC^ — (7rJ-7rA)2(7r^-7rB)2 — 
Hence, the Hessian of F{c,a) function is positive semi-definite and (A.l) is a 
convex optimization problem. We can use the following KKT necessary and 
sufficient conditions to figure out the optimal solutions: 
dF � 
瓦 = 0 ’ 
OF 
/i2 = 0, 
/ x i ( a - l ) = 0’ 
/ i2( -a) = 0’ 
Ml, "2 > 0. 
Where fj,i and fi2 are Lagrange multiplier of the constraint of a. Next we 
discuss the three possible cases of the optimal solutions: 
Case /: / a � = M l ) • 
Substituting both the revenue functions into the KKT conditions, then they 
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become: 
-T T ^ ‘ 
1 == 0， 
7T% {a, c) - TTA 7T% (a, c) - TTB 
-h{l)'T Ml)-T — 
—7-? ^ 1 w \ — P2 "1， 
(a, c) - 7TA [a, c) - TTB 
Ml (a - 1) 二 0’ 
/i2(-a) = 0’ 
"1，"2 > 0. 
Rearranging the above equations, we can get the following relationship: 
7T\{A,C) - T T A = 7 r ^ ( Q ; , c ) - t t b , 
fJ'i - = 0, 
"i(a-l) = 0’ 
"'2( —a) 二 •， 
> 0. 
If = /X2 0, then a* = 0 and a* = 1, which can not be true. Hence, 
- 例 = 灼 二 0. The optimal advertising strategy a* and payment strategy c* 
can be figured out by the first equation. The relationship between them is 
defined by: 
c* 二 — 
That is, provider A can deliver any length of its advertisement to B. It can 
get the revenue through the a proper payment from provider B. 
Case II: iU � � f B � 
Following Case I procedure, we substitute the revenue functions into the KKT 
*» 、‘ 
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conditions and get 
-TTA = 7T%{a,c) -7TB, 
/ A ( 1 ) - T - / B ( 1 ) . T = '/ii - /i2 > 0, 
= 0, 
= 0 ’ 
//1’"2 > 0. 
From the second equation, we have � I f ij,i > fi^ ^ 0, a* = 0 and 
a* = 1, which can not be true. Hence, /ii > /i2 = 0，thus, a* = 1. The optimal 
advertising strategy is that the two providers both deliver A's advertisement. 
The optimal payment strategy is defined by: 
‘ C* = -( — /a � + fA{l - P ) - F B I P ) + {pA + PB){1 - /?)) . T. 
Case III: f A � < f B � 
Again, following Case I procedure, we substitute the revenue function into the 
KKT conditions and get 
7T'X{A,C)-7TA = 7T%{A,C) -TTB, 
/ 4 ( l ) . r — / s ( l ) . T = " 1 - " 2 < 0 ， 
例 ( a - 1 ) = 0, 
= 0, 
> 0. 
Prom the second equation, we have /j,i < /12. If /i2 > /xi ^ 0, a* = 0 and • 
1，which can not be true. Hence, /ig > /ij = 0 and a* = 0. The optimal 
advertising strategy is that the two providers deliver their own advertisement. 
The optimal payment strategy is defined by: 
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A.2 Proof of Strategy for Peering over T Time 
Slot 
The maximization problem of (4.4) is similar as problem of (2.10) in terms of 
a and c. It is also not a convex optimization problem. Therefore, problem 
(4.4) can be solved by a similar methodology used in the evolvement of prob-
lem (2.10). Now, let us transform problem (4.4) into the following equivalent 
minimization problem: 
minimize诚[o，ij’c ^(c, a) = - log c)-7rAs)-(7ri,(a, c)-?:^^)) , (A.3) 
Then, we first show that the minimization problem of (A.3) is a convex 
minimization problem with respect to a and c. Lastly, as in problem of (2.10)， 
we use the KKT necessary and sufficient conditions to find out the optimal 
solutions for (A.3). As the procedures and analysis for solving (4.4) is similar 
- with the method used in solving (2.10), we would like to skip the details of 
calculation and show the results straightly. 
We find hat the solution depends on the advertisement revenue functions 
. f从 . )and fsi-)- We have three cases depending on the relationship between 
between. 
Case / : / a � = f A ( l - tJ) + / b ( 7 � ) . 
Provider A's advertisement revenue if reaching all the users equals to the sum-
mation of both providers' advertisement" revenue if the total users number is 
spitted when peering. Then, we can show that the optimal advertising strat-
egy a* and payment strategy c* can be figured out by the first equation. The 
relationship between them is defined by: 
- ( 1 - a ) f A(L - 7 D - 7 ) + (PA+PB)(7C - 7 ) ) . T. 
That is, as in the static case, provider A can deliver any length of its ad-
vertisement to B when peering over T time slots. And it can get the revenue 
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through the a proper payment from provider B. 
Case II: i U � > /乂1 - 7D + /召 (7� ) . 
Provider A's advertisement revenue if reaching all the users is greater than the 
summation of both providers' advertisement revenue if the total users num-
ber is spitted during peering. Then, we can show that he optimal advertising 
strategy is that the two providers both deliver A's advertisement for the first 
time slot, which is a* = 1. The optimal payment strategy is defined by: 
c* = � + / a ( 1 - 7 ) 
H P A + P B ) ( 7 C - 7 ) ) ' T , 
Cc^se///: /乂 1) < /乂 1 - 7D + M 7 � ) . 
Provider A's advertisement revenue if reaching all the users is less than the 
summation of both providers' advertisement revenue if the total users number 
is spitted during peering. Then, the optimal advertising strategy is that the 
two providers deliver their own advertisement for the first time when peering, 
which is a* = 0. The optimal payment strategy is defined by: 
c* = I ‘ { fBil l ) - FB{L) - - 7D + /a(1 - 7) + { V a - ^ P b M - 7)) • T. 
A.3 Proof of Strategy for Peering over One 
Time Slot 
The maximization problem of (4.18) is similar as problem of (2.10) and (4.4) 
in terms of a and c. It is not a convex optimization problem. Thus, problem 
(4.18) can be solved by a similar methodology used in the evolvement of prob-
lem (2.10) and (4.4). Again,., we can covert problem (4.18) into the following 
.4 
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equivalent minimization problem: 
minimize明o，ii’c W{c, a) = - log �)-71\4,).(7：2“0；, c)—tt^s)) ’ (A.4) 
Then, we first prove that the minimization problem of (A.4) is a convex 
minimization problem in terms of a and c. Finally, as in problem of (2.10) and 
(4.4), we can use the KKT necessary and sufficient conditions to find out the 
optimal solutions for (A.4). As the procedures and analysis for solving (4.18) 
is similar with the method used in solving (2.10), we would like to skip the 
details of calculation and present the results directly. 
We also find hat the solution depends on the advertisement revenue func-
tions /AI ' ) and fs i ' ) . We have three cases depending on the relationship 
between between. 
Case / : i U � = / a ( 1 - 7?) + /b(7?) - . 
The meaning of the relation between the two providers' advertisement revenue 
function referred to the explanation in A.2. Then, we can show that the 
optimal advertising strategy a* and payment strategy c* can be figured out by 
the first equation. The relationship between them is defined by: 
c* = [ ( ( 1 - a ) / 丑 細 - ( 1 - a ) / A ( l - 7 ? ) + ( / B ( 7 c � ) - W l - 7 ? ) ) ( T - l ) 
- ( / B ( 7 ) - /A(1 - 7))T + (R4 - 7 )T) 
That is, as in the static case and in dynamic case for peering T time slots, 
provider A can deliver any length of its advertisement to B for the first time 
slot when peering over one time slot. And it can get the revenue through the 
a proper payment from provider B. 
Case II: i U � � f A ( l - 7? ) + ’ " 
We can show that he optimal advertising strategy is that the two providers 
both deliver A's advertisement for the first time slot, which is a* = 1. The 
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optimal payment strategy is defined by: 
c* =丢 .（ - /A � + (/B(7?) —Wi-7?))cr-i) 
- ( / B ( 7 ) — - L))T + {P^ + pb)(7? - I)T) 
Case III: i U � < fA(l - 7? ) + /b (7?) . 
We can show that the optimal advertising strategy is that the two providers 
deliver their own advertisement for the first time when peering, which is a* = 0. 
The optimal payment strategy is defined by: 
c � = ^ ( ( /a(1 - 7) - fA(l - 7? ) )T + ( M j ^ ) - M j ) ) T + (p^ + p^XjO _ 
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